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 ADAR v. SMITH 
Who Do I Belong To? 
Interstate Recognition of Adoptions by Unmarried Couples in Adar v. Smitlt 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Adar v. Smith presents important questions about the scope of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause, as well as the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, in regards to illegitimate 
children. 1 These issues arose because of Louisiana's refusal to provide an amended birth 
certificate to a sub-class of children based on the marital status of their adoptive parents. In the 
conflict that generated the A dar v. Smith litigation, Louisiana's Registrar of Vital Records and 
Statistics refused to issue an amended birth certificate, when the state, based on its own public 
policy, disapproved of an out-of-state judgment of adoption to an unmarried couple of the same-
sex. 
The Louisiana statute which the Registrar of Vital Records and Statistics relied on to 
deny Mr. Adar and Mr. Smith an amended birth certificate states: 
(A) When a person [ 1] born in Louisiana [2] is adopted in a court 
of proper jurisdiction [3] in any other state or territory of the 
United States, the [Louisiana] state registrar may create a new 
record of birth in the archives (B) upon presentation of a properly 
certified copy of the final decree of adoption .... (C) Upon receipt 
of the certified copy of the decree, the state registrar shall make a 
new record in its archives, showing ... (3) the names of the 
adoptive parents and any other data about them that is available 
and adds to the completeness of the certificate of the adopted 
child.2 
A divided en bane Fifth Circuit upheld the Registrar's refusal to issue an amended birth 
certificate, stating that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not control the actions of non-
1 A dar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146, 150 (5'h Cir. 20 ll) (en bane). 
2LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 40:76(A)-(C) (emphasis added). 
Miller I 
judicial state officials and is not enforceable as to such officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.3 The 
court also held that Louisiana did not violate the Equal Protection Clause in refusing to issue 
amended birth certificates to the children of adoptive, unmarried parents, based on the state's 
disapproval of those parents' marital status.4 
A Petition for Writ of Certiorari was filed in the United States Supreme Court, but the 
Supreme Court denied the Petition for Writ of Certiorari on October II, 2011.5 As a result of the 
denial, the Supreme Court leaves intact a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling that has created a 
public policy exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Furthermore, by leaving intact the 
Fifth Circuit Court's ruling, the Supreme Court is subjecting adoptive children and their parents 
to uncertainty as to whether their familial status will be recognized by officials in other states. 
This case note will discuss both the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Equal Protection Clause 
in depth with regards to adoption decree judgments and illegitimate children. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Statement of Facts 
Oren A dar and Mickey Smith (Mr. A dar and Mr. Smith) are the parents of Infant J, a 
five-year old boy who was born in Shreveport, Louisiana and surrendered there for adoption.6 
At the time of the adoption, Mr. Adar and Mr. Smith lived in Connecticut and they obtained an 
agency adoption of Infant J in the Family Court of Ulster County, New York, pursuant to New 
York state law that authorizes joint adoptions by unmarried same-sex couples. 7 After the New 
York adoption decree was obtained, Mr. A dar and Mr. Smith arranged for the adoption decree to 
be forwarded to the Louisiana Office of Public Health, Vital Records Registry, to have an 
3Adar, 639 F.3d at 162. 
4/d. 
5 Adar v. Smith, 181 L. Ed. 2d 257 (U.S. 2011). 
6Adar, 639 F.3d at166. 
7Adar v. Smith, 597 F.3d 697, 697 (51h Cir. 2010); (reversed, Adar, 639 F.3d 146 (51h Cir. 2011)). 
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amended birth certificate issued from Louisiana. 8 The amended birth certificate would properly 
identify them both as Infant J's legal parents.9 The harms alleged by Mr. Adar and Mr. Smith to 
be caused by lack of an amended birth certificate are: ( 1) difficulties encountered in enrolling 
Infant J in Mr. Smith's health insurance plan; (2) problems encountered with airline personnel 
who suspected that the adoptive parents were kidnappers of Infant J; and (3) denial of the 
"emotional satisfaction" of "seeing both of their names on the birth certificate." 10 
The Registrar, Darlene Smith, rejected the request to issue an amended birth certificate, 
stating that Louisiana law and public policy did not permit her to issue a birth certificate with the 
names of unmarried adoptive parents. 11 The Registrar stated that the Office of Vital Records and 
Statistics was "not able to accept the New York adoption judgment to create a new birth 
certificate because": ( 1) Louisiana only authorizes in-state adoptions by single adults or married 
couples, (2) La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §40:76 vests the Registrar with full discretion in issuing 
amended birth certificates for out-of-state adoptions of Louisiana-born children, and (3) La. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. §40:76D only authorizes the Registrar to issue amended birth certificates in 
accordance with Louisiana law. 12 However, the Registrar offered to place either Mr. Adar or Mr. 
Smith's name on the birth certificate, despite the fact that the New York adoption decree lists 
both men as Infant J' s lawful parents, because Louisiana allows single-parent adoptions. 13 
8ld. 
9Id. 
10Id. at 703; see also, Pet. for Cert. at 5- Petitioners had great difficulty enrolling Infant J as a dependant on the 
health insurance coverage Smith has through his employer- a problem that recurs from time to time when the 
company conducts internal audits. They were stopped at an airport when attempting to board a flight abroad and 
asked for the child's birth certificate when airport personnel wanted to confirm their relationship to their child. 
Moreover, A dar, himself an adopted child, understands the stigma and dignitary harm that adopted children can 
experience when they are treated differently and worse than other children. 
11 Adarv. Smith, 591 F. Supp. 2d 857,859 (E.D. La. 2008). 
12Adar, 597 F.3d at 697. 
13Adar, 639 F.3d at 146. 
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After the Registrar refused to issue an amended birth certificate, Mr. Adar and Mr. Smith 
sued the Registrar under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for declaratory and injunctive relief, asserting that her 
action denies full faith and credit to the New York adoption decree and equal protection to them 
and Infant J. 14 
On a motion for summary judgment, the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Louisiana issued a mandatory injunction, commanding the Registrar to issue the birth 
certificate on grounds that Louisiana owes full faith and credit to the New York adoption decree, 
and that there is no public policy exception to the Clause. 15 Additionally, the district court held 
that the plain language of La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:76 mandates that, on receipt of a duly 
certified copy of the New York adoption decree, the Registrar had to issue a certificate for Infant 
J that contained the names of Mr. A dar and Mr. Smith as his adoptive parents. 16 
Following the Registrar's appeal, a panel of the Fifth Circuit pretermitted the Full Faith 
and Credit claim, concluding instead that Louisiana law, properly understood, required the 
Registrar to reissue the birth certificate. 17 The court stated that under the plain meaning of the 
statutes, Mr. Adar and Mr. Smith are the "adoptive parents" of Infant J for purposes of La. Rev. 
Stat. Ann§§ 40:76 and 40:77, and that under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Louisiana owes 
full faith and credit to the New York adoption decree that declares Infant J. to be the adopted 
child of Mr. Adar and Mr. Smith. 18 Additionally, the Fifth Circuit panel opinion held that§ 
40:76 does not vest the Registrar with discretion to refuse to make a new, correct birth certificate 
for a Louisiana-born child when, as here, his out-of-state adoption decree is evidenced by 
14/d. 
15Adar, 597 F.3d. at 702. 
16/d. 
17Adar, 639 F.3d. at 146. 
18Adar, 597 F.3d. at 719. 
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documentation that indisputably satisfies the requirements of§ 40:76(A) and (B). 19 Accordingly, 
the panel opinion ordered that the Registrar issue a new, correct birth certificate for Infant 1.20 
However, this court's panel opinion was vacated by the court's decision to rehear the case en 
banc. 21 
B. Issues 
The following questions were presented to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal en bane 
during their review of their panel opinion: 
(1) Whether Mr. A dar and Mr. Smith's claim for a reissued birth certificate rests on the 
Constitution's Full Faith and Credit clause, and whether it is addressable in federal court 
in a § 1983 action; and 
(2) Whether Louisiana violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
when, based on its disapproval of the unmarried status of a child's adoptive parents, the 
state refuses to issue the child with an accurate, amended birth certificate. 22 
In particular, this case raises important questions about whether non-judicial officers may, in 
carrying out their official duties, disregard some out-of-state court judgments, selectively, based 
on policy assessments about the merits of those judgments. 
i. Full Faith and Credit Clause 
Mr. Adar and Mr. Smith contend that their claim arises under the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause.23 The Full Faith and Credit Clause can be found in Article IV,§ 1, of the United States 
Constitution. The Clause states, "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public 
Acts, Records, and judicial proceedings of every other State. And that Congress may by general 
19/d. 
20/d. 
21 A dar v. Smith, 622 F.3d 426 (5th Cir. 201 0) (order to vacate). 
22Petition for Certiorari: supra note 3, at i. 
23/d. at 150. 
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Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved and the 
Effect thereof."24 Additionally, federal statutory law provides: 
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof [of 
any State, Territory, or Possession of the United States], so 
authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every 
court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions 
as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory 
or Possession from which they are taken. 25 
Here, Infant 1 was adopted in a court proceeding in New York, as evidenced by a judicial 
decree. 26 As a result, Mr. Adar and Mr. Smith contend that Art. IV, § 1 and§ 1738 oblige the 
Registrar to "recognize" their adoption of Infant 1 by issuing a revised birth certificate. 27 Mr. 
Adar and Mr. Smith argue that either the Registrar's refusal to issue an amended birth certificate 
with both names on it, or the state law on which she relied, effectively denies them and their 
child "recognition" of the New York decree.28 Thus, the Registrar, under the color of the law, 
abridged rights created by the Constitution and laws of the United States?9 
a. En Bane Majority Opinion 
A sharply divided en bane court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment 
on the Full Faith and Credit claim, reached the Equal Protection claim for the first time, rejected 
it, and remanded for dismissal of the action.30 The majority did not agree with Mr. Adar and Mr. 
Smith's argument that the Registrar's refusal to issue an amended birth certificate with both 
names on it, denied them and their child "recognition" of the New York decree.31 
24U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
2528 u.s.c. § 1738. 
26Adar, 639 F.3d at 151. 
27/d. 
28/d. 
29 !d. 
30Petition for Certiorari supra note 3, at 8. 
31 Adar, 639 F.3d. at 150. 
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The majority began the opinion with a discussion of the history and purpose of the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause. The Supreme Court has long held that under the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause, state courts would be obliged to afford a sister-state judgment the same res judicata 
effect which the issuing court would give it. 32 According to the Court, the purpose of the clause 
was to replace the international law rule of comity with a constitutional duty of sister states to 
honor the laws and judgments of sister states.33 The Court still maintains that the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause imposes a duty on state courts to give a sister-state judgment the same effect that 
the issuing court would give it. 34 
Mr. A dar and Mr. Smith asserted that plaintiffs may employ § 1983 against any state actor 
who violates one's "right" to full faith and credit, since § 1983 provides remedies for the 
violation of constitutional and statutory rights.35 However, the en bane majority held that the 
obligation created by the Full Faith and Credit Clause applies only to state courts as opposed to 
administrative bodies.36 The majority maintains that while the Supreme Court has at times 
referred to the Clause in terms of individual "rights," it consistently identifies the violators of 
that right as state courts.37 Consequently, the majority stated since the duty of affording full faith 
and credit to a judgment falls on courts, it was illogical to speak of vindicating full faith and 
credit rights against non-judicial state actors.38 Finally, the majority stated that because the 
predicates triggering full faith and credit are determinable only by courts, state executive 
32 Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. 481,485 (1813). 
33Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541,546 (1948); See also Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430,439 (1943) 
(noting that "the clear purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause" was to establish the principle that "a litigation 
once pursued to judgment shall be as conclusive of the rights of the parties in every court as in that where the 
judgment was rendered"). 
34Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 180 (1988). 
35Adar, 639 F.3d. at 153. 
36/d. 
37Adar, 639 F.3d at 154 (discussing Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77 (1944) "The refusal of the Tennessee Supreme 
Court to give credit to that judgment because of its nature is a ruling upon a federal right."). 
38Adar, 639 F.3d at 154. 
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officials are unsuited and lack a structured process for conducting the legal inquiry necessary to 
discern whether a judgment is entitled to full faith and credit, so it makes little sense to impose 
full faith and credit obligations on non-judicial officers who are not equipped for such tasks.39 
In addition, the majority stated that even if a broader individual right exists under the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause; the Supreme Court of the United States has expressly indicated that the 
only remedy available for violations of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is review by the 
Supreme Court.40 The majority explains the usual posture of full faith and credit cases as arising 
in the context of pending litigation-not as a claim brought against a party failing to afford full 
faith and credit to a state judgment, but as a basis to challenge the forum court's decision. 41 That 
is, such cases begin in state court, and the Supreme Court intervenes only after the state court 
denies the validity of a sister state's law or judgment.42 
The primary case the majority relies on in making this determination is Thompson v. 
Thompson. 43 In that case, the Court held that the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 
which imposed full faith and credit duty on states to enforce child custody determinations 
entered by sister-state courts, did not give rise to an implied private cause of action.44 The Court 
there reasoned that because Congress explicitly declined to rely on federal courts to enforce full 
faith and credit rights, the only remedy for full faith and credit violations must lie in Supreme 
Court review of state-court decisions.45 According to the majority, although the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause is part ofthe Constitution within the meaning of28 U.S.C. § 1331, "there is no 
jurisdiction because the relation of the constitutional provision and the claim is not sufficiently 
39/d. at 155. 
40/d. at 155. 
41 Adar, 639 F.3d at 154. 
42/d. 
43Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988). 
44/d. at 185-187 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2011) (PKPA)). 
45/d. 
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direct that the case 'arises under' the clause."46 As a result, absent an independent source of 
jurisdiction over such claims, federal district courts may not hear such cases.47 Therefore, to 
enforce the clause, the majority says that Mr. Adar and Mr. Smith should have sought to compel 
issuance of a new birth certificate in Louisiana courts, and then once their case was submitted to 
the state courts, the Full Faith and Credit Clause could provide the federal question necessary to 
S C . 48 support upreme ourt review. 
The majority argues that Mr. Adar and Mr. Smith downplay the significance of 
Thompson v. Thompson, because the case did not involve a state actor refusing to accord full 
faith and credit to another state's judgment, but was a suit against a private individual.49 In fact, 
the majority states that the actual relief sought by the plaintiff in Thompson was for the federal 
district court to require the "state courts" to comply with the standards established by the 
PKPA.5° Consequently, the majority makes it apparent that the only remedy for a state's refusal 
to discharge its obligations under the clause is review by the Supreme Court of the United 
States. 51 
However, there has been at least one federal court decision which has permitted a full 
faith and credit claim to be brought in federal court pursuant to § 1983, Finstuen v. Crutcher. 52 
In Finstuen, a couple sued to invalidate an Oklahoma statute that officially denied recognition to 
out-of-state adoptions by same-sex couples. 53 The Tenth Circuit not only granted relief under§ 
1983, but also ordered a new birth certificate to be issued bearing the names of the same-sex 
46Adar, 639 F.3d 146 at 157. 
47 !d. 
48/d. at 158. 
49 Adar, 639 F.3d at 155. 
sold. 
Slfd. 
52Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139 (101h Cir. 2007). 
53 !d. at 1156. 
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parents. 54 The en bane majority distinguishes Finstuen from the case at hand by stating that the 
bulk of the Finstuen opinion is devoted to the analysis of the allegedly unconstitutional state 
non-recognition statute, which is not the problem here. 55 Furthermore, Finstuen acknowledges 
the principle that "enforcement measures do not travel with the sister state judgment" for full 
faith and credit purposes, and then characterizes the birth certificate sought by the plaintiffs as an 
"enforcement mechanism."56 The discussion between recognition and enforcement mechanisms 
is discussed further in section III (A) (ii). 
The majority argues that Finstuen is distinguishable not only because the Registrar here 
concedes the validity of Infant J's adoption, but also because the Louisiana law, unlike the 
Oklahoma law, does not require issuing birth certificates to unmarried couples. 57 Additionally, 
the "enforcement measure"- issuance of a revised birth certificate- is critically different in the 
two states. 58 Because the en bane majority characterizes amending a birth certificate as an 
enforcement measure, it falls within Louisiana's discretion to decide to issue a new birth 
certificate to an unmarried couple, which is not required in Louisiana. 
Furthermore, the en bane majority stated, even if§ 1983 provided a remedy against non-
judicial actors for violations of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Mr. A dar and Mr. Smith still 
could not prevail because the Registrar has not denied recognition to the New York adoption 
decree. 59 Citing Supreme Court precedent, the majority differentiates the credit owed to laws 
and the credit owed to judgments. 60 With regard to judgments, the Court has described the full 
54 I d. 
55Jd.atll54. 
56 I d. 
57Adar, 639 F.3d at 157. 
58 I d. 
59 !d. at 158. 
60Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222 (1998). 
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faith and credit obligation as "exacting."61 The states' duty to "recognize" sister state judgments, 
does not compel states to "adopt the practices of other States regarding the time, manner, and 
mechanisms for enforcing judgments."62 Rather, enforcement of judgments is "subject to the 
evenhanded control of forum law."63 "Evenhanded" means that the state executes a sister state 
judgment in the same way that it would execute judgments in the forum court.64 
The majority goes on to say that the Registrar has not refused to recognize the validity of 
the New York adoption decree and in fact, the Registrar concedes that the parental relationship 
of Mr. Adar and Mr. Smith with Infant 1 is final and cannot be revisited in its courts.65 In 
addition, the Registrar offered to comply with Louisiana law and reissue a birth certificate 
showing one of the unmarried adults as the adoptive parent of Infant 1.66 As a result, the 
Registrar acknowledged that even though she would not issue the requested birth certificate with 
both names, she recognizes Mr. Adar and Mr. Smith as the legal parents of their adopted child.67 
The majority held that full faith and credit is not denied by Louisiana's circumscribing the kind 
of birth certificate available to unmarried adoptive parents.68 The Full Faith and Credit Clause 
does not compel "a state to substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with 
a subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate."69 The majority held that 
Louisiana has every right to channel and direct the rights created by foreign judgments, and 
61 /d. at 233. 
62/d. at235. 
63/d. 
64/d. 
65 A dar, 639 F.3d at 158. 
66/d. 
67 !d. 
68/d. at 159. 
69 A dar, 639 F.3d at 159 (citing Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988) (quoting Pac. Emp'rs Ins. Co. v. 
Indus. Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939))). 
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obtaining a birth certificate falls in the heartland of enforcement, and therefore outside the full 
faith and credit obligation of recognition. 70 
The Supreme Court continues to maintain a distinction between recognition and 
enforcement of judgments under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 71 Additionally, "the 
mechanisms for enforcing a judgment do not travel with the judgment itself for purposes of full 
faith and credit."72 To this end, the majority held the New York adoption decree cannot compel 
within Louisiana "an official act within the exclusive province" of that state [the issuing of an 
amended birth certificate]."73 Rather, the adoption decree "can only be executed in Louisiana as 
its laws may permit."74 It follows that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not oblige Louisiana 
to confer benefits on unmarried adoptive parents contrary to its law. 75 Forum state law governs 
the incidental benefits of a foreign judgment, and here Louisiana does not permit any unmarried 
couples, whether adopting out-of-state or in-state, to obtain revised birth certificates with both 
parents' names on them. 76 Thus the Registrar's refusal to place two names on the certificate can 
in no way constitute a denial of full faith and credit. 77 It follows that the majority held Louisiana 
has a right to issue birth certificates in the manner it deems fit. 78 
b. En Bane Dissent 
The dissent rejected the majority's limitation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to state 
courts, noting that the plain text of the Clause expressly binds "each State," not just "each State's 
70Adar, 639 F.3d at 159. 
71 Baker, 522 U.S. at 222. 
721d. at239. 
73Adar, 639 F.3d at 159. 
74Jd. 
751d. at 161. 
761d. 
771d. 
78Jd. 
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courts."79 When the drafters of the Constitution intended for a particular provision to bind only 
the courts of the states, they knew how to say so, as the text of the Supremacy Clause makes 
clear.80 Judge Weiner explained that, "it is a foundational principle of constitutional 
interpretation that clauses of the Constitution that are worded differently are presumed to carry 
different meanings."81 The dissent argues that the majority ignores this principle when it assigns 
the "each State" language of the Full Faith and Credit Clause the same meaning as the "Judges in 
8? 
every State" language of the Supremacy Clause. -
The dissent disagreed with the majority's decision to rely on Thompson v. Thompson as 
persuasive precedent that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not create a private federal right 
that can be asserted via § 1983 against all state actors as distinct from private actors. 83 The 
dissent stated that Thompson is properly read as holding only that there is no private remedy 
against private parties for violations of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 84 That reading is licit 
because in Thompson, the defendant was a private citizen, not a state official. 85 Therefore, 
properly understood, Thompson does not control the case at hand. 86 The reason there was no 
remedy to enforce in Thompson is because there is no implied cause of action for violations of 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause by private parties. 87 Here, when Mr. Adar and Mr. Smith are 
79/d. at I65. 
80U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every 
State shall be bound thereby .... "(emphasis added)). 
81 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, I4 U.S. (I Wheat) 304,334 (18I6) ("From this difference ofphraseology, perhaps, a 
difference of constitutional intention may, with propriety, be inferred. It is hardly to be presumed that the variation 
in the language could have been accidental. It must have been the result of some determinate reason .... "). 
82Adar, 639 F.3d at 169. 
83/d. at I 70. 
84/d. at I71. 
85Adar, 639 F.3d at I73 (citing Thompson, 484 U.S. at I78 (suit by an ex-husband against an ex-wife)). 
86Adar, 639 F.3d at 171. 
87/d. 
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suing a state actor, they have no need for an implied cause of action: Section § 1983 expressly 
provides them with the only remedy they need. 88 
Additionally, according to the dissent, the en bane majority fails to appreciate or 
acknowledge the role of§ 1983 in providing a private remedy against state actors. 89 The 
Supreme Court has repeatedly pronounced that § 1983 is a remedial statute which is intended "to 
be broadly construed, against all forms of official violation of federally protected rights."90 
Furthermore, the dissent relies heavily on Dennis v. Higgins, when arguing that even though a 
vast number of§ 1983 actions involve violations of constitutional rights in individual 
circumstances, action brought via § 1983 may assert violations of non-individual constitutional 
rights as well.91 
In Dennis v. Higgins, a motor vehicle carrier filed a § 1983 cause of action against 
Nebraska state officials for violating the Commerce Clause by imposing "retaliatory" taxes and 
fees on motor carriers that operated in Nebraska but used vehicles registered in other states.92 
The Nebraska Supreme Court ruled that "claims under the Commerce Clause are not cognizable 
under § 1983 because the Commerce Clause does not establish individual rights against 
government, but instead allocates power between the state and federal govemments."93 The 
Supreme Court nevertheless directed that "a broad construction of§ 1983 is compelled by the 
statutory language and that the legislative history of the section stresses that as a remedial statute, 
it should be liberally and beneficently construed."94 
88ld. 
89ld. at 172. 
90Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City ofNew York, 436 U.S. 658, 700-01 (1978). 
91Adar, 639 F.3d at 173. 
92Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439 (1991 ). 
93/d. at 442. 
94/d. at 443. 
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Equally important is the en bane majority's dismissal of Finstuen v. Crutcher as "an 
outlier to the jurisprudence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause."95 The dissent's argument is that 
Finstuen is both instructive and consistent with Supreme Court Full Faith and Credit Clause 
jurisprudence.96 In Finstuen, Oklahoma's existing law governing the effect of adoption 
decrees-quite similar to Louisiana's own birth certificate law-specified rights to holders of 
final adoption decrees.97 However, Oklahoma's law differed from Louisiana's, because 
Oklahoma's law had an additional statute that excluded specific subsets of out-of-state adoptive 
parents from entitlement to the benefits conferred by the general adoption law.98 Oklahoma's 
"non-recognition" statute provided: 
The courts of this state shall recognize a decree, judgment, or final 
order of adoption issued by a court or other governmental authority 
with appropriate jurisdiction .... Except that, this state, any of its 
agencies, or any court of this state shall not recognize an adoption 
by more than one individual of the same sex from any other state 
or foreign jurisdiction.99 
Like Oklahoma's general adoption statute, Louisiana's general enforcement provision is 
nondiscriminatory; and like Oklahoma's non-recognition statute, the Registrar's specific 
exception "policy" is indisputably discriminatory. 100 It is that discrimination that ultimately 
prevented Mr. Adar and Mr. Smith from obtaining the revised birth certificate that they 
otherwise would have been able to obtain but for the Registrar's refusal to "accept"- give full 
faith and credit- to their valid out-of-state adoption decree. 101 By invalidating a statute as 
violative of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Tenth Circuit clearly read the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause as binding on every branch of a state's government, and not just on state judges, 
95Adar, 639 F.3d at 181. 
96/d. 
97/d. 
98/d. at 182. 
99 !d. 
100/d. 
101/d. 
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which is in direct tension with the en bane majority's reading of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause. 102 Accordingly, the en bane majority's holding, is in undeniable conflict with the Tenth 
Circuit's opinion, which ultimately held: "Because the Oklahoma statute at issue categorically 
rejects a class of out-of-state adoption decrees, it violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause."103 
Furthermore, the en bane dissent states that the Supreme Court has defined the right 
which is secured by the Full Faith and Credit Clause as one of"recognition" not "enforcement", 
therefore making three pronouncements: ( 1) "a final judgment in one State, qualifies for 
recognition throughout the land" and thereby "gains nationwide force," 104 (2) although 
"enforcement measures do not travel with the sister state judgment as preclusive effects do, such 
measures remain subject to the even-handed control of forum law", 105 and (3) although "a court 
may be guided by the forum State's 'public policy' in determining the law applicable to a 
controversy," there is "no roving 'public policy exception' to the full faith and credit due 
. d ,]06 JU gments. 
The dissent makes the argument that the majority mistakenly converted the notion of 
"recognition" into one of "enforcement," so as to conclude that "obtaining a birth certificate falls 
in the heartland of enforcement, and therefore outside the full faith and credit obligation of 
recognition." 107 If a forum state refuses to apply its enforcement measures to only some out-of-
state judgments, i.e. doesn't maintain evenhanded control of forum law, it is essentially refusing 
to recognize the force of those disfavored out-of-state judgments in the forum state, and this is 
precisely what the Registrar has done here. 108 The Registrar has refused to recognize Mr. A dar 
102/d. 
103/d. (citing Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F .3d at 1141 ). 
104Adar, 639 F.3d at 176 (citing Baker, 522 U.S. at 233). 
105/d. 
106/d. 
107/d. 
108/d. at 177. 
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and Mr. Smith's nationwide, lawful status as "adoptive parents" by denying them the "adoptive 
parent" rights created in Louisiana's birth certificate statute. 109 In other words, the problem is 
that Louisiana is refusing rights created by its own law, but only to a subset of valid out-of-state 
adoptions, and in favoring some out-of-state adoptions over others, the Registrar is refusing to 
give full faith and credit to all of them, i.e. she is not enforcing Louisiana law in an evenhanded 
manner.
110 
Overall, when Mr. Adar and Mr. Smith legally adopted Infant J in New York, each 
gained the status of "adoptive parent" for purposes of the laws of every other state, including 
Louisiana. Consequently, when they duly requested a birth certificate, as "adoptive parents", 
pursuant to the Louisiana statute, the Registrar violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause by 
refusing to accept their request. 111 By refusing to treat both Mr. Adar and Mr. Smith as lawful 
"adoptive parents" under Louisiana's birth certificate law, the Registrar failed to recognize their 
status as defined by the New Yorkjudgment. 112 
The Louisiana statute at issue, directs the Registrar to record all validly certified out-of-
state adoption decrees, inscribing the names of all "adoptive parents" on revised birth 
certificates. 113 When carefully examined, the Registrar's actual policy is to issue new birth 
certificates containing the names of every adoptive parent for some out-of-state adoptions but not 
for others, specifically, not for adoptions by two unmarried parents. 114 
Finally, the dissent states that the Registrar's policy to refuse amended birth certificates 
to unmarried couples is discriminatory. It is that discrimination that prevented Mr. Adar and Mr. 
109 /d. 
110/d. at 178. 
111 /d. at 179. 
112/d. 
113 /d. 
114/d. at 180. 
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Smith from obtaining the revised birth certificate that they would have been able to obtain but for 
the Registrar's refusal to "accept" and give full faith and credit to their valid out-of-state 
adoption decree for purposes of Louisianan's law. 115 
ii. Equal Protection Clause 
As previously mentioned, the Louisiana law at issue requires state officials to issue 
amended birth certificates to all adopted Louisiana-born children. However, the Registrar has a 
policy of selectively refusing to apply this statute to children adopted in other states by 
unmarried couples. As a result of Louisiana's selective process, Mr. Adar and Mr. Smith filed a 
claim against the Registrar for violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Mr. Adar and Mr. 
Smith's second theory contends that denying a revised birth certificate to children of unmarried 
couples is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 116 Their theory is that Louisiana treats a 
subset of children, (adoptive children of unmarried parents), differently from adoptive children 
with married parents, and this differential treatment does not serve any legitimate governmental 
interest. 117 
a. En Bane Majority 
The en bane majority finds this theory unavailing in the face of the state's rational 
preference for stable adoptive families, and the state's decision to have its birth certificate 
requirements flow from its domestic adoption law. 118 Additionally, the majority states that Mr. 
A dar and Mr. Smith have not explained why an adoptive child of unmarried parents falls into a 
suspect classification. 119 Furthermore, the majority does not agree with Mr. Adar and Mr. 
115/d. at 182. 
116/d. at 161; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1- "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of citizens ofthe United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 
117/d. 
118/d. 
119/d. 
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Smith's reliance on the Levy v. Louisiana line of cases to support the inference that heightened 
scrutiny is required here, because the classification in those cases relates to illegitimacy. 120 The 
majority makes the argument that because Infant J's birth status is irrelevant to the Registrar's 
decision, these cases cannot support the conclusion that he belongs to a suspect class provided by 
heightened scrutiny; therefore, the Louisiana law will be upheld if it is rationally related to a 
1 . . . 121 egttimate state Interest. 
Louisiana has "a legitimate interest in encouraging a stable and nurturing environment for 
the education and socialization of its adopted children."122 The Registrar cites to the research 
institution Child Trends' report underscoring the importance of stable family structures for the 
well-being of children. 123 The report noted that marriage, when compared to cohabitation, "is 
associated with better outcomes for children," since marriage is more likely to provide the 
stability necessary for healthy development of children. 124 The majority agreed that this fact 
alone provides a rational basis for Louisiana's adoption regime and corresponding vital statistics 
registry. 125 As a result, the majority held that the law here does not attempt to encourage 
marriage or discourage behavior deemed immoral, but rather is meant to ensure stable 
environments for adopted children, and the court has sufficient basis to hold the Louisiana law 
does not run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause. 126 
12old. 
121
/d. at 162. 
122Adar, 639 F.3d at 162 (citing Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 819 (11th Cir. 
2004)). 
123/d. at 162 (citing Kristin Anderson Moore et al., Marriage from a Child's Perspective: How Does Family 
Structure Affect Children, and What Can We Do About It?, CHILD TRENDS RESEARCH BRIEF, at 6 (2002}); available 
at http://www.childtrends.org/files/marriagerb602.pdf. 
124/d. 
125 !d. 
126/d. 
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b. En Bane Dissent 
The dissent criticized the majority for reaching the Equal Protection claim "before the 
district court or even a panel of this court had done so."127 However, in applying rational basis 
review to Louisiana's differential treatment of the children of married and unmarried adoptive 
parents, the dissent rejected Louisiana's purported interest in "preferring that married couples 
adopt children." 128 
Rational basis review directs that a challenged state action be sustained "if the 
classification drawn by the action is rationally related to a legitimate state interest." 129 The 
dissent agrees that the Registrar tendered a worthy defense of Louisiana's in-state adoption laws, 
which prohibit Louisiana adoptions by unmarried couples; however, the instant case does not 
involve a Louisiana adoption at all and poses no threat whatsoever to Louisiana's adoption laws 
or adoption policy. 130 Mr. Adar and Mr. Smith's claim has nothing to do with adoption laws, 
particularly not Louisiana's adoption laws, and has everything to do with ensuring that the 
applicable Louisiana public records contain accurate and complete information, pursuant to 
Louisiana's Vital Statistics Laws. 131 Therefore, in the dissent's view, the interest asserted by the 
Registrar fails rational basis scrutiny because "the instant case does not involve a Louisiana 
adoption at all and poses no threat whatsoever to Louisiana's adoption laws or adoption 
policy." 132 Furthermore, because the Registrar's action occurred long after Infant 1 had already 
been adopted, the dissent explained, "there is no way that the potential stability of Infant 1' s 
127 !d. at 182. 
128/d. at 183. 
129City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 400 (1985). 
130Adar, 639 F.3d at 184. 
131/d. 
132/d. 
Miller 20 
home could have been improved by the Registrar's post hoc action" of denying an amended birth 
certificate. 133 
Additionally, the dissent makes the argument that the appropriate comparative class is not 
"married adoptive parents versus unmarried adoptive parents," but "unmarried biological parents 
versus unmarried adoptive parents."134 In fact, by statute, Louisiana recognizes and issues birth 
certificates to unmarried biological parents, irrespective of its policy preference that children 
only have parents who are married to one another. 135 Just as Mr. Adar and Mr. Smith are the 
unmarried legal parents of Infant J by virtue of the New York adoption decree, Louisiana cannot 
control or change the fact that, both in and outside Louisiana, unmarried couples have and adopt 
children. 136 
The dissent's final argument runs that because Louisiana will issue a birth certificate listing 
both members of an unmarried couple as parents when they are the biological parents of the 
child, the Registrar must identify a legitimate government interest that is served by 
distinguishing between and treating differently for purposes of issuing birth certificates ( 1) a 
couple comprising unmarried non-biological adoptive parents and (2) a couple comprising 
unmarried biological parents, all of whom have equal rights under the law. 137 The Registrar 
defended her policy as a refusal "to recognize permanently in Louisiana public records, a parent-
child relationship that cannot exist under Louisiana law." 138 According to the en bane dissent, 
her statement is false because some unmarried couples (unmarried biological parents), can and 
do maintain parent-child relationships that are recognized under Louisiana law and are recorded 
133 /d. 
134/d. at 185. 
135/d. (citing LA. REV. STATE. ANN.§ 40:34 (B)(l)(h)(ii)- If a child is born outside of marriage, the full name ofthe 
father shall be included on the record of birth of the child only if the father and mother have signed a voluntary 
acknowledgement of paternity or a court of competent jurisdiction has issued an adjudication of paternity). 
136/d. 
137 /d. 
138/d. at 185. 
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on Louisiana birth certificates. 139 As such, according to the dissent, it is strongly arguable that 
there is no legitimate governmental interest served by refusing to issue Infant J. an accurate birth 
certificate with Mr. Adar and Mr. Smith's names on it, particularly given that, neither Louisiana 
law nor the Registrar prevents all unmarried couples from being named as parents on birth 
certificates in Louisiana's permanent public records. 140 
III. ANALYSIS: 
A. Full Faith and Credit Clause 
i. Legal Background 
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution demands that "Full Faith and Credit 
shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other 
State."141 The Supreme Court first interpreted the Full Faith and Credit Clause to require that an 
out-of-state judgment be given the same effect in the several states as it would be given in the 
adjudicating state. 142 The purpose of the Clause was to alter the status of the several states as 
independent foreign sovereignties, and to make them integral parts of a single nation throughout 
which a remedy upon a just obligation might be demanded as of right, irrespective of the state of 
its origin. 143 Put differently, the purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause was to "transform 
an aggregation of independent, sovereign States into a nation." 144 
Supreme Court precedent differentiates the credit owed to laws and to judgments. 145 
Credit must be given to the judgment of another state although the forum would not be required 
139 !d. 
140/d. 
141 U.S. CONST. art. IV,§ 1. 
142Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481,485 (1813). 
143 Baker, 522 U.S. at 222. 
144Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 355 (1948). 
145 Baker, 522 U.S. at 231. 
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to entertain the suit on which the judgment was founded. I46 However, the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause does not compel "a state to substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes 
dealing with a subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate."I 47 Regarding 
judgments, the full faith and credit obligation is exacting. I48 A final judgment in one State, if 
rendered by a court with adjudicatory authority over the subject matter and persons governed by 
the judgment, qualifies for recognition throughout the land. I49 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly and forcefully held that states must recognize sister-
state judgments even if they find them offensive on public policy grounds. I so Therefore, a court 
may be guided by the forum state's "public policy" in determining the law applicable to a 
controversy, but the Supreme Court's decisions support no roving "public policy exception" to 
the full faith and credit due to judgments. I 5 I 
Finally, full faith and credit does not mean that States must adopt the practices of other 
States regarding the time, manner, and mechanisms for enforcing judgments. I 52 Enforcement 
measures do not travel with sister state judgments as preclusive effects do; such measures remain 
subject to the even-handed control of forum law. I 53 
ii. Personal Analysis 
When the en bane majority found that the Louisiana Registrar of Vital Records and 
Statistics did not have to amend Infant J's birth certificate, it violated the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause. The dissent correctly read the Full Faith and Credit Clause as applying to the states and 
146Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 ( 1935). 
147Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493,501 (1939). 
148Baker, 522 U.S. at 233. 
149 !d. 
150Baker, 522 U.S. at 233 (rejecting a public policy exception). 
151Jd. 
152Jd. at 235. 
153 ld; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 99 ( 1969) ("The local law of the forum determines the 
methods by which a judgment of another state is enforced."). 
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not just the state's courts. By reading the Full Faith and Credit Clause to apply to states, it forces 
the state's officials and administrative bodies to abide by the Full Faith and Credit Clause when 
recognizing all sister-state judgments; including adoption decrees. 
There are three rationales offered by those who question the obligation to give full faith 
and credit to adoption decrees: ( 1) a public policy rationale- the argument is that states which 
deny unmarried couples, including gays and lesbians, the right to adopt may also decline to 
recognize adoptions deemed fundamentally inconsistent with their public policy, 154 (2) since 
many adoption proceedings are uncontested, questions have been raised as to whether a final 
adoption decree issued in the absence of an adversarial hearing is sufficiently reliable to be 
entitled to recognition under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 155 and (3) while the law of the 
rendering state determines the status of the adopted child vis-a-vis her biological parents, other 
states may apply their own enforcement mechanisms and their own laws to determine the 
incidents or consequences of that status [i.e. enforcement vs. recognition argument]. 156 
None of these rationales justify non-recognition of sister-state adoption decrees. The 
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that states must recognize sister-state judgments even if they 
find them offensive on public policy grounds. 157 Public policy does not justify denying a 
judgment of another State for two reasons: ( 1) Supreme Court precedent states that there is no 
public policy exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and (2) a public policy exception 
would in effect be unjust to the child and his adoptive parents if the subsequent state could 
decline to recognize their legal adoption decree based on the public policy of the second state. 
154Rhonda Wasserman, Are You Still My Mother?: Interstate Recognition of Adoptions by Gays and Lesbians, 
(2009) 58 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (citing Finstuen, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 1304 (identifYing Oklahoma's arguments) (reversed 
by Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139 1 O'h Cir. Okla.2007)). 
155/d. (citing Finstuen, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 1305). 
156/d. (citing Finstuen, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 1306). 
157Baker, 522 U.S. 222 at 233 (rejecting a public policy exception). 
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Furthermore, final adoption decrees are issued by courts at the conclusion of judicial 
proceedings, and as a result, the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires all states to recognize these 
judgments, even if the adoptive parents are gay and even if the adoption law of the enforcing 
state prevents adoptions by unmarried couples. 
The first rationale to be addressed is the public policy rationale. The public policy 
rationale posits that non-adoption states which retain or develop an interest in the adoptee and his 
or her family should be free to advance their public policies, and if necessary, deny recognition 
to adoptions finalized in sister-states that violate those policies. 158 However, the public policy 
rationale fails to justify non-recognition of sister-state adoption decrees. As previously stated, 
the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the public policy rationale for non-recognition of 
judgments. 159 In Baker, the Supreme Court stated that "regarding judgments ... the full faith 
and credit obligation is exacting .... " 160 A valid judgment rendered in one State will be 
recognized and enforced in a sister-state even though the strong public policy of the latter state 
would have precluded recovery in its courts on the original claim. 161 
For instance, if the state to which the family moved were to refuse to recognize the 
adoption, in the absence of a legally recognized parent-child relationship, the "would-be" parents 
(i.e. Mr. Adar and Mr. Smith), might not be able to secure employer-provided health insurance 
for Infant J, authorize medical care and emergency treatment for him, make educational 
decisions on his behalf, obtain a Social Security card for the child, or take him on international 
flights. 162 This is the exact result from the en bane majority's holding. Denying Infant J's 
158Wasserman, supra note 154, at 272. 
159 Baker, 522 U.S. 222 at 233. 
160/d. 
161ld. 
162Linda S. Anderson, Protecting Parent-Child Relationships: Determining Parental Rights of Same-Sex Parents 
Consistently Despite Varying Recognition of Their Relationship, 5 PIERCE L. REV. 1, 18 (2006) (discussing the 
effects of non-recognition of legally-recognized parent-child relationships). 
Miller 25 
adoptive parents the right to an amended birth certificate, makes it difficult for Mr. Adar and Mr. 
Smith to provide Infant J with some of the most basic benefits a child receives from his or her 
parents. Furthermore, allowing a public policy exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
would create substantial uncertainties and anxiety in regards to the adoptive family. For 
example, this public policy exception could have the effect of deterring both unmarried and 
same-sex adoptive fmnilies from moving to different states, in fear that their family unit may not 
be recognized. Non-recognition of the legal adoption decree would change the legal status of 
their families, and question whether the adoptive parents are still the legal parents of the child, 
once in the new state. All in all, a public policy exception to the recognition of adoption decrees 
would change the benefits of the parent-child relationship, to their detriment. 
The second rationale which supports opposition to the recognition of adoption decrees is 
the unreliability rationale of non-adversarial adoption decrees. States have made the argument 
that an adoption decree is not the type of judgment to which the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
applies, but rather is "a matter of contract between the birth parents and the prospective adoptive 
parents, and not a judicial proceeding in the usual sense of the word."163 In short, the underlying 
premise is that adoption proceedings are non-adversarial in nature, resolved by private agreement 
rather than by judicial determination. 164 However, there are important differences between 
adoption proceedings and private agreements between parties. For instance, adoptions require 
the sanction of a judicial officer, which comes in the form of a judgment. 165 Furthermore, 
adoption proceedings usually have experts present who evaluate both the prospective parents and 
their home to determine whether the placement is in the child's best interests. Although adoption 
163Finstuen v. Edmondson, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1304 (W.D. Okla. 2006) (describing the defendant's arguments). 
164/d. at 1305. 
165 /d. 
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proceedings may be non-adversarial in nature, an adoption decree is still the result of a judgment 
and therefore entitled to interstate recognition. 
The last rationale to address is the enforcement versus recognition rationale. This 
rationale posits that states need not "adopt the practices of other States regarding the time, 
manner and mechanisms for enforcing judgments. Enforcement measures do not travel with the 
sister-state judgment ... ; such measures remain subject to the evenhanded control of forum 
law." 166 It is well established that states are free to apply their own enforcement measures to 
sister-state judgments; 167 but states may not tinker with enforcement mechanisms in an effort to 
avoid their obligation to recognize sister-state judgments. 168 Here, the Louisiana Registrar of 
Vital Records and Statistics stated the issuance of an amended birth certificate fell into the realm 
of"enforcement" and therefore outside the reach of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. By 
categorizing birth certificates as an enforcement mechanism, the Registrar says that she has not 
in fact denied recognition of the New York adoption decree of Infant J., because by offering to 
place either Mr. Adar or Mr. Smith's name on his birth certificate, she is in fact recognizing the 
New York adoption decree. Because Louisiana does not allow unmarried couples to adopt 
within its State; the Registrar said she did not have to enforce the New York adoption statute, 
which allowed unmarried couples to adopt, because the issuance of a revised birth certificate fell 
within the enforcement mechanism of Louisiana. To this end, the en bane majority's decision 
effectively places unmarried adoptive parents of Louisiana born children at a disadvantage 
because the State in fact denied recognition to the legal adoption decree in its refusal to issue an 
amended birth certificate, because in its opinion, birth certificates fall into the realm of 
166Baker, 522 U.S. 222 at 235. 
167 !d.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 99 ( 1971) ("The local law of the forum 
determines the methods by which a judgment of another state is enforced."). 
168Wasserman, supra note 154, at 321. 
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enforcement. However, by denying an amended birth certificate with both adoptive parents' 
names is denying recognition to the legal adoption decree and therefore a violation of the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause. 
B. Equal Protection Clause 
The Supreme Court has made it clear that government discrimination against children 
based on their parents' marital status must be viewed with suspicion and subjected to heightened 
scrutiny. 169 Unlike other Louisiana born children, Louisiana born children who are adopted in 
other jurisdictions by unmarried couples are denied a birth certificate that identifies each of their 
legal parents. As a result, these children are disadvantaged in each context in which a birth 
certificate is used to confirm the legal parent-child relationship. Here, the proper inquiry is 
whether denying accurate birth certificates to Louisiana born children adopted by out-of-state 
unmarried couples, while granting complete and accurate birth certificates to other Louisiana 
born children, is substantially related to an important governmental objective. 
i. Legal Background 
In considering whether state legislation violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court applies different levels of scrutiny to different types 
of classifications. At a minimum, a statutory classification must be rationally related to a 
legitimate governmental interest purpose. 17° Classifications based on race or national origin, 171 
and classifications affecting fundamental rights, 172 are given the most exacting scrutiny. 173 
Between these extremes of rational basis review and strict scrutiny lies a level of intermediate 
169Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). 
17
°Clark, 486 U.S. at 461 (citing San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973)). 
171 Clark, 486 U.S. at 461(citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 17 (1967)). 
172/d. (citing Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,672 (1966)). 
173 /d. 
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scrutiny, which generally has been applied to discriminatory classifications based on sex or 
'11 . . 174 1 egtttmacy. 
The Supreme Court has confirmed that laws denying benefits and protections to children 
based on the marital status or conduct of their parents are subject to intermediate constitutional 
scrutiny. 175 To withstand intermediate scrutiny, the statutory classification must be substantially 
related to an important governmental objective. 176 Consequently, the Supreme Court has 
invalidated classifications that burden illegitimate children for the sake of punishing the illicit 
relations of their parents, because "visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical 
and unjust." 177 
In fact, there has been a series of Supreme Court decisions which established the 
principles that the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses prohibit states from penalizing 
children because their parents are unmarried. 178 In Levy and subsequent cases, the Supreme 
Court rejected the comrnon law rule that treated non-marital children disparately, and invalidated 
a state provision denying children of unmarried parents the right to bring claims for wrongful 
death. 179 Additionally, the Supreme Court noted, it is "illogical and unjust" to penalize non-
marital children for the circumstances of their birth by denying them important rights and 
. 180 protections. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recognized that the principle of equal treatment for 
all children is not limited to laws that disadvantage children with unmarried parents, but also 
applies to any law that penalizes children solely because of the conduct or behavior of their 
174/d. (citing Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982). 
175Clark, 486 U.S. at 461; see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 ( 1982). 
176Clark, 486 U.S. at 461. 
177/d. (citing Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)). 
178Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 
( 1988). 
179Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). 
180Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972). 
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parents. 181 In Plyler v. Doe, the Supreme Court struck down a law that barred undocumented 
immigrant children from attending public school, holding that "even if the State found it 
expedient to control the conduct of the adults by acting against their children, legislation 
directing the onus of a parent's misconduct against his children does not comport with 
fundamental conceptions of justice."182 Additionally, in Trimble v. Gordon, the Supreme Court 
rejected the argument that a State may attempt to influence the actions of men and women by 
imposing sanctions on their children. 183 
ii. Personal Analysis 
It is important to note that although illegitimacy is not as big of an issue today as it was 
roughly thirty years ago when the illegitimacy cases were decided by the Supreme Court, it is 
still necessary to ensure that certain sub-sets of children are not treated less favorably than others 
based on their legal relationship to their parents. Today, illegitimacy and Equal Protection 
claims arise more often in regards to adoptive children and their parents, which is the claim here 
with Mr. Adar, Mr. Smith and Infant J. The first step to determine whether the en bane 
majority's decision violated the Equal Protection Clause is to determine the appropriate standard 
of review to apply. There are three types of scrutiny to choose from: ( 1) strict scrutiny, (2) 
intermediate scrutiny, and (3) rational basis review. Based on the previous discussion regarding 
the standards of review to be applied in Equal Protection claims, the appropriate standard of 
review for the case at hand is intermediate scrutiny. 
In applying intermediate scrutiny to the case at hand, there is no important governmental 
interest that is substantially related to Louisiana's refusal to provide an accurate birth certificate 
to a Louisiana born child adopted in another state by an unmarried couple. Here, the Registrar 
181Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
182/d. at220. 
183Trimble v. Gordon, 439 U.S. 762 (1977). 
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claims her policy of refusing to issue amended birth certificates to children adopted by unmarried 
parents is justified because of Louisiana's interest in preventing unmarried couples from 
adopting. However, the Supreme Court has held that States cannot deny important rights or 
benefits to children in order to encourage marriage or the creation of marital families. 184 The 
Registrar's policy does not further the purported state interest, nor does it satisfy the demands of 
intermediate scrutiny. 
Furthermore, even if rational basis were applied to justify the Registrar's refusal to amend 
the birth certificate, the Registrar's policy does not rationally further a legitimate state interest 
because the Registrar's policy in effect, denies accurate birth certificates to a group of children 
who have already been validly adopted in another State. A child adopted by an unmarried 
couple will be parented by the unmarried couple regardless of whether or not his or her birth 
certificate lists each of his or her legal parents. The relationship between denying accurate birth 
certificates to children adopted by unmarried couples, and any interest in preventing children 
from being parented by unmarried couples is too attenuated to be credited. Due to the fact that 
denying an accurate birth certificate to children adopted by unmarried couples does not further 
any interest in preventing children from being parented by unmarried couples, its purpose is only 
to express disapproval of the unmarried couple, which is not an important governmental interest 
that is substantially related to Louisiana's refusal to provide an accurate birth certificate to Infant 
J. 
Additionally, the Registrar's policy harms children adopted by unmarried parents, 
because it deprives them of "substantial benefits accorded to children generally,"185 allegedly for 
the purpose of encouraging adoptions by married parents. In fact, by the Registrar refusing to 
184Levy, 391 U.S. at 72. 
185Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973). 
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amend the birth certificate of children legally adopted by unmarried couples in other states, 
Louisiana is creating a subclass of children who are being treated differently solely because of 
the marital status of their parents. Denying accurate birth certificates to only children adopted by 
unmarried parents harms these children without advancing any legitimate, much less any 
important, state purpose, and therefore violates the Equal Protection Clause. 
IV. CONCLUSION: 
Parents and their children cross state borders assuming that their parent-child relationship 
will be recognized wherever they go. However, the result of Adar v. Smith demonstrates that this 
is not always the case. Given that the Full Faith and Credit Clause: ( 1) requires judgments 
rendered in one state to be recognized in a sister state, and (2) applies to states, not just state 
courts, the Louisiana Registrar of Vital Records and Statistics should have issued an amended 
birth certificate to Infant J, listing both Mr. Adar and Mr. Smith as his legal parents. 
Furthermore, because there is no roving public policy exception to the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause, Louisiana should not have been allowed to deny the amended birth certificate on the 
grounds that Louisiana does not allow unmarried parents to adopt Louisiana born children. 
Additionally, issuing an amended birth certificate is a recognition mechanism, not an 
enforcement mechanism, and as a result, the en bane majority's refusal to issue an amended birth 
certificate to Infant J in effect, denies Mr. A dar and Mr. Smith recognition of their adoption 
decree. 
It is true that under an Equal Protection analysis, the issue of illegitimacy does not 
receive strict scrutiny, but it also does not receive rational basis review. The proper standard of 
review for an illegitimacy claim is intermediate scrutiny. Here, the Registrar does not have an 
important governmental interest for denying an amended birth certificate to children of 
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unmarried adoptive parents. A child adopted by an unmarried couple will be parented by the 
unmarried couple regardless of whether or not his or her birth certificate lists each of his or her 
legal parents. It follows that the Registrar should have recognized and enforced the New York 
adoption decree because they did not satisfy intennediate scrutiny. In all, interstate recognition 
of adoption decrees would halt the unequal treatment that unmarried and same-sex adoptive 
families receive from states that do not approve of their lifestyle and provide the unmarried 
adoptive families with the benefits conferred upon all other recognized families. 
Although family law has traditionally been viewed as the province of the states, 186 there 
is presently a federal bill which has been introduced to Congress, the "Every Child Deserves a 
Family Act". The bill is intended to prohibit discrimination in adoption or foster care placements 
based on the sexual orientation, gender identity, or marital status of any prospective adoptive or 
foster parent, or the sexual orientation or gender identity of the child involved. 187 However, this 
bill runs counter to the interests of the state. The state in which an individual is domiciled 
typically views itself as "most concerned in his personal relations" and therefore justified in 
applying its law to determine matters of personal status. 188 It will be interesting to see how the 
Act will affect the relationships between potential adoptive families and states. The Act goes 
against many of the states' adoption statutes and policies which prevent adoptions by certain 
groups of people (i.e. same-sex couples and unmarried couples), to allow the adoption of a child 
by an individual, regardless of their sexual orientation, gender identity, or marital status. As a 
result, the child's best interests would be placed ahead of the state's interest in having children 
raised in a nuclear family. After all, is it not in the best interests of the child to have a loving 
family, regardless of whether he or she has two moms, two dads, or unmarried parents? 
186Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689,703 (1992). 
187Every Child Deserves a Family Act, H.R. 1681, lith Cong. (2011). 
188Wassennan, supra note 154, at 269. 
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